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1. Introduction
There is wide political consensus within the European Union that decisions on public
education should be left to individual member states. Bene…ts, however, accrue partly
to other member states through migration. By providing skilled immigrants, investments
in internationally applicable education generate positive externalities to other member
states. As individual member states have no incentives to internalize these externalities,
decentralized decision-making tends to lead into ine¢ciently low investments in interna-
tionally applicable degrees. Increased mobility of the highly educated generates incentives
to scale back public …nancing, recently exempli…ed in the introduction of top-up fees in
England. Before that Sweden replaced a system of income-contingent loans, in e¤ect be-
tween 1989 and 2001, by ordinary annuity loans. (CSN 2002). Sweden abandoning its
income-contingent loan system may re‡ect the pressures of increased labor mobility. Of
all of those who graduate from Swedish universities, 15 percent emigrate. (Eklund 1998).
Unlike income-contingent loans, annuity loans do not require cooperation from foreign
tax authorities.
Emigration from the member states of the European Union is disproportionally large
among the highly educated. Docquier and Marfouk (2004) de…ne brain drain as the
proportion of working-age individuals (aged 25 and over) with at least tertiary education,
born in a given country but living elsewhere. In the 24 other EU member states but
Cyprus, the emigration rate of those with tertiary education varied between 2.6 percent
of Spain and 55.2 percent of Malta, exceeding 10 percent in Austria, Estonia, Hungary,
Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the
United Kingdom. The emigration rate of those with tertiary education is between 7
and 10 percent in the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg,
and the Netherlands. The emigration rate of those with secondary education exceeds 10
percent only in Ireland, Malta, and Portugal, and is between 7 and 10 percent in Greece
and Slovakia. (Docquier and Marfouk 2004)
Even though the possibility of migration reduces the incentives of individual gov-
ernments to provide internationally applicable education, it also encourages students to
study more intensively, by increasing the expected returns to human capital. Private
e¤ort and public provision are complements in the formation of human capital. Increased
complementary investments by students may also encourage more public investments.
This paper examines the e¤ects of migration on the provision of country-speci…c and
internationally applicable public education when public and private investments in hu-
man capital are complements. Including these two aspects of human capital formation
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allows evaluation of whether the brain gain e¤ect would swamp the brain drain e¤ect in
the public provision of education, so that an increased mobility would result in higher
public investment. Country-speci…c skills may include both tertiary education with na-
tional emphasis, like degrees in law and certain humanities, and also secondary education
which is less mobile. Correspondingly, internationally applicable education may include,
in addition to science-based, commercial and other internationally applicable degrees in
tertiary education, those …elds in secondary education (like nurses) which are internation-
ally mobile.
The framework used allows the member states of the common labor market, from now
on referred to as federation, to di¤er in general productivity. The analysis considers both
the case in which member states levy only wage taxes on their residents, and also a case
in which member states levy also graduate taxes which are paid to the country which
provided education independently of future domicile. Graduate tax is used to denote a
tax which is collected from university graduates, without a requirement that tax revenue
collected from them would have to equal the costs of providing education. Such graduate
taxes give the country which educated migrants a stake also in their productivity gains
earned elsewhere. This study focuses on education targeted to young adults.1 While tax-
ing the income of nationals living abroad may seem a radical proposal from the European
perspective, it is already part of the Unites States tax code: American citizens living
abroad are required to report their income also to the United States, and the income is
taxed with certain exemptions and credits for taxes paid abroad. (See Desai et al. (2004)
for an overview.)
The main results are the following. If there are no graduate taxes and governments
care only about the citizens who stay, then governments tend to reduce investment in
internationally applicable education when its applicability increases. If a government
attaches a su¢ciently high positive weight also on the utility of emigrants, then it might
increase investment in internationally applicable education when it becomes more mobile.
Independently of the weight attached to emigrants and of the productivity di¤erential
between the two countries, replacing part of the current wage taxes by a graduate tax
always leads to higher welfare and more e¢cient investment in internationally applicable
education than the current system, provided that the aggregate tax rate does not increase.
In addition, this study …nds that the welfare e¤ects of an increase in labor mobility
1In the spirit of Tiebout (1956), parents valuing education may buy better education for their children
by paying higher taxes. Such a mechanism is much weaker in higher education, as young adults may go
to a university in a di¤erent city, or even country, than in which their parents pay taxes.
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may be non-monotonic for the recipient country. For the sake of argument, consider rich
and poor member states of the European Union. Increasing international applicability of
human capital initially bene…ts rich member states by allowing them to attract skilled
workers from poor member states. However, if migrating to a rich member state becomes
very attractive, this may discourage the government of the poor member state to provide
citizens internationally applicable education. The rich member state would also be hurt
by losing a base of potential immigrants.
This paper does not address the issue of whether education should be provided pub-
licly. It takes as its starting point the stylized fact that education is predominantly
provided publicly in the European Union, and then asks how increasing international ap-
plicability of certain types of education a¤ects the incentives of governments to provide
those. In Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, and Poland, 100 percent of tertiary edu-
cation is publicly …nanced. The share is at least 80 percent also in Belgium, the Czech
Republic, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Slovakia and Sweden. In Hungary,
the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom the share of public …nancing is 70 to 80
percent. (OECD 2004) Taking a normative stance, private …nancing of public education
would be more e¢cient in the framework of this study, as there are no market failures.2
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews literature. Section 3 develops
the model. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 discusses the implementation, as well
as arguments in favor of income-contingent loans. Section 6 concludes.
2. Literature review
A key question in …scal federalism literature is whether decentralized outcomes are
e¢cient or not, and whether centralization would increase or decrease welfare. Justman
and Thisse (1997) show that a government that maximizes the utility of immobile residents
reduces investment in public education when the educated become mobile. Their model
includes only one type of education. Another ine¢ciency is identi…ed by Wildasin (2000).
When the highly-skilled become mobile, tax competition tends to erode any taxes they
2In a richer framework but without mobility, García-Peñalosa and Wälde (2000) compare the e¢ciency
and equity e¤ects of alternative ways of …nancing higher education. They argue that, with uncertainty,
the graduate tax is a better solution than student loans, student loans whose repayment is conditional on
future revenue, or relying on general tax revenue. Poutvaara (2004) compares private …nancing, relying
on general tax revenue, graduate taxes, and income-contingent loans when labor is mobile between two
symmetric member states, and there is no private investment in e¤ort. He …nds that private investment
is e¢cient if there are no externalities, and costs are subsidized at the same rate as wages are taxed. If
there are externalities, then public provision may be more e¢cient.
3
have to pay. This shifts the burden of …nancing public education to immobile tax bases.
If taxation relies heavily on less mobile and less educated workers, then public education
would imply regressive redistribution. It seems unlikely outcome, in that governments
must gain political support from the citizens staying.3
Brain drain literature, pioneered by Grubel and Scott (1966) and Bhagwati and
Hamada (1974), highlights the losses that emigration imposes on source countries. This
view has been questioned by recent literature, suggesting that emigration may bene…t the
source country. Mountford (1997) and Stark et al. (1997) show that when students invest
privately in their human capital, some migration from developing countries to developed
countries may actually bene…t the country of origin. The mechanism is as follows. A
possibility to migrate to a richer country increases the expected return to human capital
investment in a poor country, thus encouraging private investment. Even with a part
of high-skilled workers migrating, this initial brain gain may dominate, so that the less
developed country can end up with a higher average level of human capital per worker
with migration than without it. The empirical analysis by Beine et al. (2001) shows that
such a bene…cial brain drain cannot be ruled out. Finally, Stark and Wang (2002) show
that a possibility of migration to a richer country may serve as a substitute for subsidies
for human capital formation, thus potentially bene…ting also the country of emigration.
These contributions focus on private investment in human capital, and they study the use
of migration quotas by less developed countries. This study focuses on public provision
of education, in the presence of complementary private investment. It assumes that there
are no legal restrictions to migration, consistent with the EU principles of free mobility.
Also Poutvaara (2004) studies public and private provision of di¤erent types of educa-
tion with di¤erent tax rules. This paper di¤ers in three respects. First, Poutvaara (2004)
assumes that human capital depends only on individual ability and public investment in
education, while this paper allows human capital to depend also on private investment in
e¤ort. Including simultaneously complementary public and private investments in human
capital allows analysis of whether the brain drain e¤ect could be swamped by the brain
gain e¤ect in the public provision of education. This study considers both the extensive
margin of how many students are educated, and the intensive margin of how much they
invest in their e¤ort, and how much human capital is generated. Second, Poutvaara (2004)
models only a federation of symmetric member states, while this paper allows member
3A di¤erent view on tax competition may arise if governments cannot commit to taxation, either
explicitly or implicitly. Andersson and Konrad (2003) and Thum and Uebelmesser (2003) suggest that
labor mobility could increase investment in education as it serves as a commitment device to low taxation.
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states to di¤er. Allowing for di¤erent productivities is important to allow comparisons
with the brain gain literature, which has focused on unilateral migration from poor to
rich countries. Third, Poutvaara (2004) allows for externalities, while this paper derives
its results in the absence of externalities.
The graduate tax discussed in this paper bears certain similarities to the debate on
taxing immigrants from the developing countries, following the seminal contribution by
Bhagwati and Hamada (1974). Bhagwati and Hamada (1982) analyze the e¤ects of taxing
emigrants on decisions to migrate, on educational choices, and on the welfare of those
who do not migrate. They conclude that e¢cient education and migration decisions are
achieved and the welfare of those left behind is maximized when the marginal tax rate
on income abroad and on income earned domestically are equal and close to unity, and
the intercept of the linear tax schedule abroad equals the intercept at home, deducted
by the uniform cost of migration. Baumol (1982) gives the intuition for why freedom
of migration without taxation may reduce the welfare of those who remain in the poor
country, but that taxation and free migration can be superior for them to either prevention
of migration or freedom of migration without taxation. The intuition relies on output
distribution frontier, which traces out the economy’s output and income distribution
options. Wilson (1982) proves the existence of an optimal tax system under which each
individual resides where he or she pays the greatest tax, when the objective is to maximize
world’s social welfare. Unlike these previous contributions which assume that education
results from private investment or is exogenous, this paper includes publicly provided
education. Productivity depends on the type of education that the government provides,
and on individual ability and e¤ort. Also, this paper analyzes also migration going in
both directions, while previous literature has focused on unilateral migration. Recently,
Desai et al. (2004) present empirical evidence of the consequences of human capital ‡ows
between developing and developed countries.
3. The model
3.1. Game structure
A federation consists of two member states, labeled A and B. Both member states are
populated by heterogeneous citizens who become educated and work. Each citizen lives
for two periods, becoming educated in his or her member state of birth in the …rst period,
and choosing where to live, work and pay taxes in the second period. All the production
takes place in the second period. The paper focuses on a two-period model, even though
all the results could be generalized to an overlapping generations framework at the cost
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of notational complexity.4 There are two types of education, labeled ? and ?. These
subscripts refer to whether the education is internationally applicable (?) or country-
speci…c (?). Only those with internationally applicable education may migrate. Students
with ability-intensive internationally applicable education may also invest privately e¤ort
in their education. Such investment cannot be veri…ed by the government.
The education is provided publicly. To focus on government decisions on what type
of education to provide, it is assumed that the tax rates are exogenous and the same in
the two member states.5 The governments have two di¤erent tax instruments: A general
wage tax rate ?? is levied on all wage income generated domestically, while there may
also be a graduate tax rate ? ?, paid by graduates to the member state which initially
provided their education. In other words, also migrants pay their graduate taxes to their
member state of origin. The total tax rate is then ? = ?? + ? ?, satisfying ?? ¸ 0? ? ? ¸
0? ? ? 1. Governments are benevolent, choosing the education that maximizes the after-
tax consumption of their remaining citizens, and possibly attaching a positive weight also
on their migrating citizens. The government budget constraint is balanced over the two
periods by adjusting in the second period politically chosen transfers to a subset of those
with country-speci…c skills. For example, this subset may consist of civil servants who
would provide ordinary labor services but be paid more than their outside option.
The timing of actions is as follows. In the …rst stage, national governments decide
what type of education they provide to their citizens. In the second stage, those becoming
educated decide on their investment in e¤ort. The …rst and the second stage take place
during the …rst period. In the third stage, at the beginning of the second period, those
with internationally applicable education learn what would be their wage in the other
member state. In the fourth stage, those with internationally applicable skills decide
whether to migrate or not. In the …fth and …nal stage, the educated supply labor and
pay taxes, and the government collects wage taxes, pays the debt accumulated in the …rst
period to …nance education, and uses the rest of the tax revenue to pay for the exogenous
public consumption and the budget-balancing transfer. The timing of events is depicted
as Figure 1.
4The analysis in the overlapping generations framework is available as CESifo Working Paper 1369,
December 2004.
5Keen and Marchand (1997) use the same assumption when they study the e¤ect of …scal competition
on the composition of public expenditure in the presence of mobile capital. They …nd that in a non-
cooperative equilibrium, public expenditures are biased toward the provision of public inputs at the
expense of local public goods bene…ting immobile residents.
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Figure 1: The timing of events.
3.2. Production
The production function is linear in the two types of human capital. Aggregate pro-
duction in member state A is given by ? ? = ??? + ??? , in which ??? , ? 2 f?? ?g, is
the post-migration stock of e¤ective human capital of type ?, as de…ned in the following
subsection. Labor markets are competitive, so that gross rates of return to human capital
of both types are equal to unity. Income di¤erences then follow from di¤erent amounts of
human capital. Aggregate production in member state B is given by ? ? = ???? + ???? ,
in which ??? , ? 2 f?? ?g, is the post-migration stock of e¤ective human capital of type ?.
Without loss of generality, it is assumed that 0 ? ? · 1. This formulation allows for both
a symmetric and an asymmetric federation.
Citizens di¤er in their productivity if they would complete education ?, while they
have identical productivity if they would complete education ?. Human capital of type ?
is a joint product of teaching and studying.6 For a citizen with ability ? and individual
e¤ort ?, the individual human capital stock is before eventual migration
??(?? ?) = ?+ ?? (1)
Human capital with education of type ? is for all individuals normalized to unity: ??(?) =
1.
The monetarized cost of e¤ort ? is ??2. This formulation of an increasing marginal
cost guarantees a bounded investment in ?. The resource cost for universities of education
?? ? 2 f?? ?g? is ?? in member state A and ??? in member state B. The assumption that
the government’s costs of providing education in member state B are a multiplicative ?
6All results would hold if also human capital of type ? would be a joint product of teaching and
studying.
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of those in state A captures the stylized fact that as a signi…cant part of the costs of
providing education are wage costs, an increase in the general level of productivity also
causes an increase in the cost of providing education.
Ability ? follows, in both member states, a continuous distribution between 0 and
?, with density function ?(?) and cumulative distribution function ? (?). It is assumed
that ? ? 1 and that parameter values are such that at least the government of member
state A always invests in both types of human capital. The utility of the educated is
linear in their consumption, net of the monetarized e¤ort cost of investment in education,
and all consumption takes place in the second period. Also, ?? ? ? to guarantee that
country-speci…c education is more pro…table than no education at all.
3.3. Migration
A share ? of internationally applicable education in one member state is applicable
in the other member state in case of migration, satisfying 0 ? ? · 1. Each individual
faces an individual-speci…c random component related to productivity abroad, unknown
to the government and the individual before investing in education but known to the
individual before migration. The random component takes a multiplicative form 1+ ?, so
that ? is uniformly distributed between ¡0?5 and 0?5. Some individuals would then lose
an individual-speci…c share of their productivity in case they emigrate, while others would
bene…t from a boost in their productivity abroad. As an example of a negative value of ?,
a skilled worker with low realized language skills would lose a signi…cant part of his or her
productivity abroad. On the other hand, a migrant from Germany to France may be more
successful in selling French products to Germany than a French worker with same innate
abilities would be. More generally, the presence of workers from di¤erent countries may
allow a multinational company to operate more e¢ciently. However, this also requires
that workers are socially skilled and capable of working in a multicultural environment,
something which may be revealed only during studies or after their completion.
Previous literature has focused on the role of migration as an insurance against
country-speci…c shocks. For example, Wildasin (2000) assumes that education is industry-
speci…c and that industries face country-speci…c shocks. Then allowing for migration
would insure against these risks. Poutvaara (2000) combines individual-speci…c and
country-speci…c shocks, showing that investment in education may even be increasing
in the magnitude of country-speci…c shocks in the common labor market. The reason for
this is that the presence of shocks increases expected returns to education. Both Wildasin
(2000) and Poutvaara (2000) assume that individuals and countries are ex ante identical,
and that the educated are fully mobile. The results of this paper could be extended to
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include region-speci…c shocks by assuming as Wildasin (2000) that there are several ex
ante identical industries in each region and that these face di¤erent shocks, thus insuring
the government against aggregate uncertainty about tax revenues.
A productivity di¤erential between the member states if ? ? 1 would further motivate
migration from member state B to member state A. At the same time, it would increase
the threshold value of the positive random term needed to induce migration from member
state A to member state B. An individual with internationally applicable education would
then emigrate from member state A to member state B if and only if
?(1 + ?)? ? 1? (2)
and from member state B to member state A if and only if ?(1+?) ? ?. Parameter values
? and ? are assumed to satisfy ? ? ??2? ? ? 2?3. The …rst assumption guarantees that not
everyone with internationally applicable education emigrates from member state B. The
second assumption guarantees that there is at least some migration between symmetric
member states, that is with ? = 1. With these assumptions, (2) de…nes the cuto¤ level
of ?? = min(1?(??)¡1? 12) below which citizens with internationally applicable education
remain in member state A. Therefore, there is no migration from member state A if
?? · 2?3. Correspondingly, the cuto¤ level below which citizens remain in member state
B is given by ?? = ??? ¡ 1. For simplicity, ? is assumed to not be correlated with
individual ability ?. By this assumption and the properties of a uniform distribution, the
share of remaining internationally applicable human capital is given by ?(??) = ?? +1?2,
? 2 f???g.
When there is also some migration from member state A, ?(??) = 1?(??)¡1?2 is the
share of those with education ? who do not migrate. The probability that an individual
with education ? would emigrate is then
?? =
3
2
¡ 1
??
. (3)
As long as ?? ? 2?3, there is emigration from member state A. The probability of
emigration reaches its peak of 0?5 when ? = 1 and ? = 1. The probability of emigration
from member state B is
?? =
3
2
¡ ?
?
? (4)
As migration occurs only when the productivity of migrants is higher in the other
member state, brain exchange increases the aggregate production. Note that the produc-
tivity of all migrants with education ? is higher in their new member state of residence, as
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otherwise they would not migrate in the …rst place. The average productivity multiplier
of migrants from member state A is7
?? =
3
4
?? +
1
2
? if ?? ?
2
3
? (5)
If ?? · 2?3, there is no migration as ?? = 0, and thus ?? is not determined in the model.
To simplify future notation, ?? = 1 if ?? = 0. The average productivity multiplier of the
human capital of migrants from member state B is
?? =
3?
4
+
?
2
? (6)
If the member states are identical, that is, ? = 1, the average productivity multiplier
is the same for migrants from both member states. The productivity multiplier reports
the average post-migration productivity of the pre-migration human capital of migrants.
The average productivity of migrants from member state A is ?? times as high in member
state B as it would have been in member state A. The average productivity of migrants
from member state B is ???? times as high in member state A as it would have been in
member state B.
3.4. Private investment in education
By (1), (3) and (5), a student in internationally applicable education in member state
A chooses private e¤ort ?? to maximize
?(1¡ ??)(1¡ ?)(?+ ??) + ???(1¡ ?)??(?+ ??)¡ ??2??
provided that there is a positive probability of migration, that is ?? ? 0. The …rst two
terms are the discounted value of expected future after-tax income, with an individual
discount factor ?, 0 ? ? · 1. The third term is the immediate e¤ort cost. This formulation
results in the optimal e¤ort choice
?? =
(1¡ ? )?(1¡ ?? + ????)
2?
=
(1¡ ? )?(9
8
?? + 1
2?? ¡ 12)
2?
? (7)
If ?? = 0, then the optimal e¤ort choice is ?? = (1¡ ? )??(2?).
A student receiving education ? in member state B would then choose e¤ort ?? to
maximize
?(1¡ ??)(1¡ ? )?(?+ ??) + ???(1¡ ? )??(?+ ??)¡ ??2??
7With ? being uniformly distributed between ¡0?5 and 0?5, the highest value of 1 + ? is 32 , while the
lowest value with migration is 1 + ?? = 1?(??).
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resulting in the optimal e¤ort choice in member state B (after inserting (4) and (6))
?? =
?(1¡ ? )(9?
8
¡ ?
2
+ ?
2
2? )
2?
? (8)
The equations (7) and (8) imply that the investment in e¤ort by students receiving edu-
cation ? is increasing in ? and in ? in both member states.
3.5. Public education and aggregate production
The government has access to entrance examinations which allow it to screen appli-
cants to the ability-intensive education. While not used in all countries, entrance exam-
inations or results from end-of-school tests are commonly used to select those who are
admitted. The cuto¤ level of ability chosen by the government ?, ? 2 f???g, is denoted
by ?? , below which citizens are educated in …eld ? and above which in …eld ?. Thus, the
stock of human capital ? in member state ? is ??? = ? (??), and the pre-migration stock
of human capital ? is in member state ?
e? ?? = Z ?
??
? (?)??? + [1¡ ? (??)] ?? ?
The …rst term on the right-hand side reports that part of pre-migration human capital
? which depends on individual ability, and the second term the part determined by indi-
vidual e¤ort. Post-migration internationally applicable human capital in member state
? consists of share (1¡ ??) of domestically created human capital and human capital of
those who have immigrated from member state ?, ? 6= ?:
? ?? = (1¡ ??) e? ?? + ???? e??? ?
The government in each member state collects wage taxes at rate ?? and graduate
taxes at rate ? ? from the educated to …nance exogenous public consumption ?? , public
education, and the budget-balancing endogenous transfer, ??, to some or all of citizens
with country-speci…c skills.8 The government’s intertemporal budget constraint reads in
member state A as
???(??? +?
?
? ) + ?? ?[?
?
? + (1¡ ?? + ????) e??? ]
= ??? + ??? (b??) + ??(1¡ ? (b??)) + ???
8Assuming the government to distribute the budget surplus to all citizens would complicate migration
decisions, tilting migration somewhat towards the country with higher budget surplus. With symmetric
member states, the budget surplus per citizen would be identical in equilibrium, and would thus not distort
migration. Finally, note that exogenous public consumption can be set at a level in which transfers are
initially zero.
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and in member state B as
???(???? + ??
?
? ) + ?? ?[??
?
? + ((1¡ ??)?+ ????) e??? ]
= ??? + ???? (b??) + ???(1¡ ? (b??)) + ????
The left-hand side is the government budget revenue. The …rst term gives wage tax
revenue from the educated residing in the country, and the second term graduate tax
revenue from those who received their education in the country. The right-hand side
reports the expenditures, consisting of the exogenous revenue requirement, the costs of
providing the two types of education, and the budget-balancing endogenous transfer, ??.
All second-period expenses are discounted to the …rst period, using the same discount
factor ? as citizens use.
Even when restricting the analysis to a utilitarian government, one has to specify
to what extent the government values the utility of emigrants and immigrants. The
analysis proceeds under the following assumptions. The government values the after-tax
income of its emigrating citizens, compared to the income of remaining citizens, at rate
?, 0 · ? · 1. The government weights the graduate tax revenue that it is able to
collect from emigrants in the same way as it values the income of its remaining citizens.
The privately chosen e¤ort cost of students with internationally applicable education does
not enter into government decision-making. The government attaches a zero weight to
immigrants.9 The social welfare function is given by
???? = ?
h
(1¡ ? )??? + (1¡ ??)(1¡ ? ) e??? + ???(1¡ ? )?? e??? + ??i ?
The …rst two terms inside the brackets give the after-tax income of the educated who
stay, the third term is the social valuation of the utility of the educated who emigrate,
and the fourth term is the transfer. Correspondingly, for member state B
???? = ?
h
(1¡ ? )???? + (1¡ ??)(1¡ ? )? e??? + ???(1¡ ? )?? e??? + ??i ?
4. Results
4.1. Welfare e¤ects of graduate taxes
Governments choose the cuto¤ levels of ability that maximizes their objective func-
tions. Di¤erentiating ???? with respect to ?? gives as the …rst-order condition
? ¡ ?? = ? [1¡ ?? + ????(1¡ ? )?+ ??????] (?? + ??) ¡ ???
9Importantly, the results are independent of whether the government also values the utility of immi-
grants or not. The assumption of zero weight simpli…es notation.
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On the left-hand side, we have the marginal social bene…t of a student receiving
country-speci…c education. This is independent of ability. On the right-hand side, we have
the marginal social bene…t of a student receiving internationally applicable education.
This value is increasing in the student’s ability. The …rst-order condition allows us to
solve for the cuto¤ level of ability below which the government provides country-speci…c
education, and above which internationally applicable education:
b?? = ?¡ ?? + ??? [1¡ ?? + ????(1¡ ? )?+ ??????] ¡ ??? (9)
Comparative statics yield that investment in education ? is increasing in ?? and ? and
decreasing in ?? and ?, as ?????? ? 0. Correspondingly, the …rst-order condition of the
???? allows to solve as the cuto¤ ability level
b?? = ??¡ ??? + ???? [(1¡ ??)?+ ????(1¡ ? )?+ ????? ?] ¡ ??? (10)
A general result with graduate taxes is derived.
Proposition 1 Governments invest more in internationally applicable education with
graduate taxes than with only domicile-based taxation. Investment in internationally ap-
plicable education is increasing in the graduate tax rate.
Proof. Insert (7) into (9) and (8) into (10). The …rst terms on the right-hand side of
the resulting expressions are decreasing in ?? , while the second terms are independent of
it.
Notice that this result is independent of the weight assigned to emigrants, and of the
relative importance of private investment in e¤ort. A central result is then:
Proposition 2 Allowing member states to levy graduate taxes is welfare improving.
Proof. See Appendix.
4.2. International applicability and education policy
While the analysis of the welfare e¤ects of graduate taxes yields general results, welfare
e¤ects of changes in the international applicability parameter ? are more di¢cult to
determine. To simplify, the analysis focuses on two polar cases: a federation of two
symmetric member states, and an asymmetric federation in which migration goes only
from the poor to the rich member state.
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An increase in international applicability of human capital encourages private invest-
ment in it. Given that private and public investments are complementary, this would leave
the e¤ect of an increased international applicability of education ? on public investment
in it a priori unclear. On one hand, brain drain e¤ect would push the government to
reduce public investment in it, while brain gain e¤ect would render investing in it more
attractive. Remarkably, this analysis …nds that the brain drain e¤ect always dominates
in public investment, provided that the government cares only about its citizens staying.
Proposition 3 If the governments in a symmetric federation attach a zero weight on
emigrants and there are no graduate taxes, then governments always reduce investment in
internationally applicable education when its applicability increases.
Proof. See Appendix.
Due to the presence of the brain gain e¤ect, however, the aggregate stock of interna-
tionally applicable human capital may either increase or decrease when its international
applicability increases:
Proposition 4 If the governments in a symmetric federation attach a zero weight on
emigrants and there are no graduate taxes, then an increase in the applicability of inter-
nationally applicable education may result in either a larger or smaller pre-migration stock
of it.
Proof. See Appendix.
This …nding relates to results by Mountford (1997), Stark et al. (1997) and Stark
and Wang (2002): a positive probability of migration encourages private investments in
human capital. The results of this analysis arise from a common labor market of two
symmetric countries. Previous literature on brain drain and brain gain has focused on
migration from a less developed country to a more developed country. (See Mountford
(1997), Stark et al. (1997), Beine et al. (2001) and Stark and Wang (2002))
Proposition 4 suggests that in addition to the cost of private e¤ort, ?, also ability
distribution plays an important role in determining whether an increase in international
applicability of internationally applicable human capital increases or decreases its forma-
tion. The intuition is as follows. If the density of abilities around the marginal ability
of internationally applicable education is low, then the negative e¤ect at the extensive
margin from reduced public provision is small, and the positive e¤ect from the increased
private e¤ort at the intensive margin dominates. On the other hand, if the density of abil-
ities around the cuto¤ level is high, then an increase in the minimum ability above which
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the government provides internationally applicable education excludes a large number of
students, and the extensive margin may dominate.
Importantly, an increased mobility of labor need not always reduce total resources used
to …nance education. Whether this is the case or not depends on which type of education
is more expensive. Also when internationally applicable education is less expensive, an
increased probability of migration reduces individual government’s incentives to invest in
it.
When the government attaches the same weight to emigrants as to citizens staying,
increased mobility may lead to either a larger or smaller investment in internationally
applicable education. On the one hand, e¢ciency gains from brain exchange for emigrants
encourage governments to invest more in internationally applicable education. On the
other hand, governments are pushed toward less investment because they lose tax revenue
from emigrants.
Proposition 5 If the governments in a symmetric federation attach a su¢ciently high
weight on emigrants, they may increase investment in internationally applicable education
when its applicability increases, provided that wage tax rate is not too high.
Proof. To prove its existence, set ?? = 0, ?? = ??, ? = 1 and ? = 1 in (9), after
inserting (7). Then di¤erentiating yields ?b????? ? 0 by ? ¸ 2?3.
Assume next an asymmetric federation with ?? · 2?3. Parallel to the analysis of a
symmetric federation,
Proposition 6 Assume an asymmetric federation in which there is emigration only from
member state B. If there are no graduate taxes and the government of member state B
attaches a zero weight on the utility of emigrants, then it always reduces investment in
internationally applicable education when its applicability increases.
Proof. See Appendix.
This proposition shows that even as brain gain from the possibility of migration in-
tensi…es, the government of the poorer member state still reduces its investment in inter-
nationally applicable human capital, as its applicability increases. Interestingly,
Proposition 7 Assume an asymmetric federation in which there is emigration only from
member state B, and there are no graduate taxes and the government of the member
state B attaches a zero weight on the welfare of emigrants. An increased probability of
emigration from member state B to member state A may either increase or decrease welfare
in member state A.
15
Proof. See Appendix.
To summarize, the welfare e¤ects of international applicability may be non-monotonic.
Also the member state bene…ting from immigration may be hurt if its attractiveness
increases too much, relative to the other member state. The reason why an increase in the
mobility of labor from the poorer to the richer member state may decrease welfare in the
richer member state hinges on the policy response of the government in the poorer member
state. If a further increase in the probability of emigration results in the government of the
poorer member state switching to o¤ering country-speci…c education, the richer member
state su¤ers also as it no longer receives immigrants and the tax revenue they would o¤er.
5. Discussion
With benevolent governments analyzed so far, there would be no e¢ciency justi…cation
for a system of voluntary income-contingent loans, as opposed to compulsory system of
graduate taxes, collected independently of domicile. Nonetheless, a system of income-
contingent loans might be preferable when the benevolence of governments is not assured.
Voluntary contracts on income-contingent loans would protect citizens against Leviathan
governments. Poutvaara (2004) derives, in a symmetric federation and without private
investment in e¤ort, conditions under which income-contingent loans would induce the
government to choose the same provision of internationally applicable education as with
graduate taxes, and without which the government would provide less internationally
applicable education with income-contingent loans.
The implementation of graduate taxes or income-contingent loans requires that all
member states of the federation collect tax revenue or loan repayment also for the other
member states. This would call for a creation of a European tax payer identity number,
as well as exchanging information between member states. A European tax payer iden-
ti…cation number could be constructed from existing national social security numbers by
adding a country code in front of them, and deciding that the …rst social security number
received with its initial country code would serve as the European tax payer identi…cation
number also in the case of changing nationality. Alternatively, immigrants from another
member state could still receive a new social security number in their new country of
residence, with obligations from the previous country being automatically transferred to
the new account.
Implementing transfers between member states would su¤er from the incentives of
individual member states to avoid ful…lling their obligations, but these same problems are
already present in implementing agricultural and regional policy. To deter cheating by
16
member states, the European Union could implement a system in which member states
caught cheating would face heavy …nes, and individual civil servants exposing malpractice
by their governments would receive immunity of prosecution related to exposing such
o¤ences, as well as a …nancial reward for exposing those. Such a reward could be a
fraction of penalties imposed on the government caught violating rules, with a ceiling at,
say, one to ten million euros, depending on the type of violation exposed. This same
incentive scheme could be used to deter and detect malpractices in other programs, as
well as inside EU administration. A European tax payer identi…cation number could also
be used to exchange information on labor and capital income earned in di¤erent member
states, thereby limiting the possibilities of tax evasion.
6. Conclusion
This paper shows that decentralized decision-making on public education encourages
the member states of the European Union to distort the provision of public education away
from internationally applicable education, toward country-speci…c skills. If governments
focus on the utility of those citizens (and voters) who stay, they reduce the provision of
internationally applicable education even when students would increase complementary
private investment in e¤ort. This analysis thus suggests that the brain drain e¤ect would
dominate the brain gain, at the extensive margin of a government deciding how many
students it provides internationally applicable education. At the intensive margin of
students deciding on their complementary private investment in e¤ort, an increase in
international applicability results in more e¤ort. The net e¤ect can then go either way.
Whether the behavioral responses at the intensive margin by students or at the ex-
tensive margin by governments dominate, behavioral responses at the extensive margin
lead to ine¢ciently low number of students receiving internationally applicable education.
As a remedy, this study suggests introducing graduate taxes or income-contingent loans,
paid according to the same rules independently of future domicile. Giving member states
a stake in e¢ciency gains also earned elsewhere would encourage governments to invest
more in human capital bene…ting also the other member states. The enlargement of the
European Union increases potential bene…ts of establishing graduate taxes or income-
contingent loans. With current tax rules, incentives of citizens and those of governments
would diverge. Students would …nd incentives to study for migration, thanks to higher
expected earnings elsewhere. Governments, on the other hand, would face incentives to
educate students to stay, by o¤ering them too little internationally applicable human
capital, and too many country-speci…c skills.
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This analysis relies on several simplifying assumptions, some of which should not
change the underlying results, while others can be expected to a¤ect policy conclusions.
It assumes that production technologies are linear in the two types of human capital. This
implies that wages of a given occupation do not change as a result of changes in the number
of those educated in that occupation. This assumption should not a¤ect any qualitative
results. This paper analyzes the e¤ects of marginal changes in international applicability
or graduate tax rates. Any changes in the relative wage rates are induced e¤ects of
changes in the relative stocks, and are thus induced second-order e¤ects. A quantitative
analysis of non-marginal changes should, naturally, aim at capturing complementarities
and substitutabilities in production. Also, tax rates are taken as given, following Keen
and Marchand (1997). Endogenizing these tax rates is left for future research, as are
possible interactions that such tax rates or educational investments could have with public
provision of infrastructure.
Perhaps the most important assumption is that the governments are benevolent, and
do not su¤er from the time-consistency problem. In the analyzed model with benevolent
governments and without the commitment problem, there is no motivation for relying
on income-contingent loans, as opposed to graduate taxes. Allowing for a commitment
problem or governments which are not entirely benevolent would likely to change this. In a
world where the benevolence of governments is not universally guaranteed, constitutional
design has to trade-o¤ the adverse selection problem and the need to tame Leviathan
governments. Accepting a certain degree of adverse selection would then be optimal,
and could be interpreted as a federation’s insurance premium against potential abuses
by governments. Voluntary contracts would also solve the time-consistency problem that
may arise even when governments are benevolent.
Appendix.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Welfare e¤ects of education policy of either member state can be divided into internal-
ized e¤ects and externalities on the other member state. Country-speci…c education does
not generate externalities, while internationally applicable education generates a positive
externality to the other member state as the other member state bene…ts from migrants
who pay wage taxes there. By Proposition 1, an increase in the graduate tax rate increases
the provision of internationally applicable education. As either country could have left its
education policy unchanged, both countries perceive their own social welfare to increase
as a result of providing more internationally applicable education. But as this increases
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also the welfare of the other member state, it clearly increases the sum of welfare in the
two member states.
Proof of Proposition 3.
Inserting (7) and setting ? = 0? ? ? = 0? ? = 1 in (9), b?? = ?¡??+???[ 1?¡ 12 ] ¡ (1¡? )?(98 ?+ 12?¡ 12 )2? .
Di¤erentiate
?b??
??
=
?¡ ?? + ??
?( 1? ¡ 12)2?2
+
Ã
¡(¡
1
2?2 +
9
8
)(1¡ ?)?
2?
!
? (A1)
The …rst term is positive, and the second negative. Notice that when both types of
education are provided, social surplus from providing education ? has to exceed that from
providing education ? with ? = 0. That is, ?¡ ?? ? (1¡ ??)??? ¡ ??. By (3) and (7), this
implies that
2?(?¡ ?? + ??)
( 1? ¡ 12)(1¡ ?)
? (¡1
2
+
1
2?
+
9?
8
)?2? (A2)
The right-hand side of (A1) is positive if 2?(?¡??+??)
( 1?¡ 12 )(1¡?)
? (¡ 1
2?2 +
9
8
)( 1? ¡ 12)?2?2. By (A2),
this holds if 9?
2
16
+ 1? ¡ 34 ? 0. This condition always holds as ? · 1.
Proof of Proposition 4.
It is useful to write the stock of internationally applicable human capital explicitly as
a function of ? :
e? ?? = Z ?b??(?) ?(?)???+ [1¡ ? (b??(?))] ?(¡
1
2
+ 1
2? +
9?
8
)(1¡ ?)
2?
?
Di¤erentiation with respect to ? yields
? e???
??
=
"
¡b??(?)¡ ?(¡12 + 12? + 9?8 )(1¡ ? )
2?
#
? (b??(?))?b??(?)??
+ [1¡ ? (b??(?))] ?(¡ 12?2 + 98)(1¡ ? )
2?
= ¡?¡ ?? + ??
?( 1? ¡ 12)
?(b??(?))?b??(?)?? + [1¡ ? (b??(?))] ?(¡
1
2?2 +
9
8
)(1¡ ?)
2?
?
The last line uses (9) and (7). The …rst term is negative as ?b??(?)??? ? 0 by Propo-
sition 3. (Note that ? ? ?? by assumption) The second term is positive by ? ? 2?3. If
? (b??(?)) ! 0, the …rst term vanishes. Then the second term dominates, and ? e??? ??? ? 0.
If ? ! 1, then ? e??? ??? ? 0 by Proposition 3.
19
Proof of Proposition 6.
With ? = ? ? = 0 and (8), (10) simpli…es to
b?? = ?¡ ?? + ???(?? ¡ 12) ¡
?(1¡ ?)(9?
8
¡ ?
2
+ ?
2
2? )
2?
?
Di¤erentiation with respect to ? yields
?b??
??
=
(? ¡ ?? + ??)?
?(?? ¡ 12)2?2
¡ ?(1¡ ? )(
9
8
¡ ?2
2?2 )
2?
This is positive if and only if
2?(? ¡ ?? + ??)
?2(?? ¡ 12)(1¡ ? )
? (
9
8
¡ ?
2
2?2
)(
?
?
¡ 1
2
)
?2
?
(A3)
On the other hand, we have a requirement that in order to have any country-speci…c
education being provided, it must hold that the expected social surplus from providing
this exceeds that of providing internationally applicable education for a citizen with zero
ability. That is, ??¡ ??? ? ?(1¡ ??)??? ¡ ???. Inserting yields
??¡ ??? ? ?(?? ¡
1
2
)?
?(1¡ ? )(9?
8
¡ ?
2
+ ?
2
2? )
2?
¡ ???
This implies that
2?(?¡ ?? + ??)
?2(?? ¡ 12)(1¡ ? )
? (
9?
8
¡ ?
2
+
?2
2?
)? (A4)
The left-hand sides of (A3) and (A4) are identical. (A4) thus implies that (A3) holds
if the right-hand side of (A3) is less than the right-hand side of (A4). This is the case if
(
9
8
¡ ?
2
2?2
)(
?
?
¡ 1
2
)
?2
?
? (
9?
8
¡ ?
2
+
?2
2?
)?
This simpli…es as 9
16
+ ?
3
?3 ¡ 3?
2
4?2 ? 0. If ? ¸ ?, this always holds as the sum of the two
last terms is positive. Assume next that ? ? ?. To simplify notation, de…ne ? ´ ???,
noting that 0 ? ? ? 1. What remains to prove is that ?(?) = 9
16
+?3¡ 3
4
?2 ? 08? 2 (0? 1).
Di¤erentiating ?(?), we …nd that it is decreasing in the area to be studied when ? ? 1
2
,
and increasing when ? ? 1
2
. It thus su¢ces to study the value of the function at ? = 1
2
.
As ?(1
2
) = 1
2
, the claim is proven.
20
Proof of Proposition 7.
Assume …rst that the probability of migration from B to A is zero. Then an increase
clearly bene…ts the member state A as it receives tax revenue from immigrants. If, how-
ever, the probability of migration increases to one and ? is su¢ciently low, then the
government of member state B stops investment in internationally applicable education.
Thus, an increase in ? (or a decrease in ?) improves welfare in member state A when
migration is su¢ciently small, but reduces welfare in member state A when migration is
su¢ciently large.
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